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3038. polymorphic_allocator::allocate should not allow integer overflow to create vulnerabilities

Section: [mem.poly.allocator.mem] Status: Open Submitter: Billy O'Neal III Opened: 2017-11-16 Last modified: 2018-06-18

Priority: 2

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At the moment polymorphic_allocator is specified to do sizeof(T) * n directly; this may allow an attacker to cause this calculation to overflow, resulting in allocate() not meeting its postcondition of returning a buffer suitable to store n copies of T; this is a common bug described in CWE-190.

Making this into a saturating multiply should be sufficient to avoid this problem; any memory_resource underneath polymorphic_allocator is going to have to throw bad_alloc (or another exception) for a request of SIZE_MAX.

(There's also a minor editorial thing here that Returns should be Effects)

[2018-06 Rapperswil Thursday issues processing]

Consensus was that the overflow should be detected and an exception thrown rather than leaving that to the underlying memory resource. Billy to reword, and then get feedback on the reflector. Status to Open.

Proposed resolution:

Wording relative to N4700.

  1. Edit [mem.poly.allocator.mem] as indicated:

    Tp* allocate(size_t n);

    -1- ReturnsEffects: Equivalent to

    return static_cast<Tp*>(memory_rsrc->allocate(SIZE_MAX / sizeof(Tp) < n ? SIZE_MAX : n * sizeof(Tp), alignof(Tp)));